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SOME MODEST SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING PUBLIC
UTILITY RATE PROCEEDINGSf
Roger C. CramtonThe agencies regulating public utilities are under attack as
ineffective and inefficient. Professor Cramton here discusses
the proceduralimpediments to efficient and coherent regulation on both the state and federal levels. To improve administrative procedure in this area, Professor Cramton recommends retention of the adversary form of rate proceedings as
a useful truth testing device, wider use of hearing examiners,
adoption of a system of written presentationof evidence, and
placing greater personal decisional responsibility on agency
heads.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the
regulatory process. Public utility commissions, it is charged, have
failed to do an effective job of regulating the electric, telephone and
gas utilities." The transportation agencies have failed-depending on
the bias of the critic-to suppress "destructive competition" or to unleash the "dynamic forces" of free competition.2 And all of the critics
appear to be unhappy with the state of the world as viewed from the
listener's end of a radio or television set.8 In short, skepticism concerning the extent to which regulation is effective in achieving its
goals is widespread.
t This Article borrows heavily from the draft of a report which the author prepared for the Committee on Rulemaking of the Administrative Conference of the
United States. Although the final report of the Committee on Rulemaking has
been published, Improvements in the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings: A
Report of the Committee on Rulemaking, in Administrative Conference of the
United States, Selected Reports, SEN. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 75-114
(1963), it is not readily available to the bar.
* Professor of Law, The University of Mfichigan. BA., Harvard; J.D., University of Chicago.
ISee BAuSH, TpANSFORmNG PUBLIc UTILT REGULATION 3-138 (1950); Sma'n
& GiEs, THE REGULATORY PRocss: EcoNoinc IssuEs An PMWOitAuCE (1965);
WI.cox, PUBLic PoLIcIEs TowARD BusNEss 571-77 (1955); Gray, The Passing of
the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAm & P.U. EcoN. 8 (1940).
2
BERNsT=aN, REGULATING Busnss By INDEPENENT CosinsSioN (1955); Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public
Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative
Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HAlw. L. REv. 1105, 1119-29 (1954).
3 See FREmo
Awi REsPoNsmiarnY IN BiOADcASTn G (Coons ed. 1961); MiNow,
EQUAL TmM-THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1964).
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Much of this criticism has taken a procedural turn. Three major
weaknesses of public utility regulation have been empasized: (1)
delay in the disposition of business, 4 (2) uneven quality of decisions,5
and (3) lack of coherence and direction.6 Regulatory commissions take
too long in disposing of contested rate filings or license applications.
Lengthy proceedings exhaust the participants and run the risk of being
irrelevant by the time they are concluded. If the decision rendered
at the end of the road is poorly reasoned, it gives slight solace to the
losing party. If that decision lacks clarity, either because it is ambiguously phrased or because important considerations have been deliberately omitted, it provides little guidance to the affected industry.
The interrelationship of these alleged weaknesses adds to the sharpness of the attack. Because individual adjudications are lengthy, uncoordinated, and ad hoc in character, the agency devotes most of its
efforts to the flood of complaints, applications, and filings that are received. It loses control of its workload and is deprived of initiative
and choice. The reliance on adjudicatory techniques also tends to
create a passive frame of mind on the part of the agency heads, who
attempt to retain flexibility by limiting the scope of individual decisions. This, in turn, fails to provide guidance to those subject to the
regulation, resulting in useless applications and proceedings, which
then contribute to the mounting backlogs and increasing delays. And
so on, in the usual pattern of the vicious circle.
Thoughtful readers will recognize the caricature as well as the truth
that is inherent in this graphic portrayal of the regulatory process.
The reply that the charges are overdrawn (which they are) or that
they are inapplicable to a particular agency (which may well be so)
is insufficient. Methods must be found to improve the speed and effectiveness with which public utility commissions perform their responsibilities. This Article, largely confined to the handling of formal
rate proceedings, attempts to outline some modest suggestions for improving the fairness and efficiency of public utility regulation.
State and federal statutes empowering regulatory commissions to
determine the lawfulness of rates of public utilities have many common
elements.7 Public utilities are invariably required to file and publish
4See, e.g., Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 CoLU..
L. REv. 429, 432-36 (1960); Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and
Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49 A.B.A.J. 833 (1963).
5See Hector, Government by Anonymity: Who Writes Our Regulatory Opinions?, 45 A.BA.J. 1260 (1959); Westwood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the
Practitioner,43 MnqN. L. REv. 607, 614-19 (1959); Westwood, Administrative Proceedings: Techniques of Presiding, 50 A.BA.J. 659 (1964).
asTRAIE AGENcms 1-26 (1962), also in 75
N DvLY, THE FEDERAL ADm
6 See
HARv. L. REv. 863-83 (1962).
7The description that follows summarizes the major features of statutory rate
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their rate schedules in accordance with statutory procedures or rules
prescribed by the particular commission. It is made unlawful to charge
any rate other than the published rate. The initiative in filing initial
or changed rates, however, is retained by the utilities, but the statutes
require them to give a stated notice (usually thirty days) to the commission and the public of any change in rates. After publication of
the rate, informal statements asserting its illegality ("protests") may
be filed within a limited period by competitors or consumer interests.
The commission then has the remainder of the statutory notice period
in which to determine whether to suspend the effectiveness of the
proposed rate pending an investigation of its lawfulness.
In general, the suspension determination is a summary administrative decision made without a hearing and not subject to judicial review. In most commissions the staff investigates the proposed rate in
the light of the protests and other submitted material, and makes a
recommendation to the agency heads as to whether the rate should
be suspended or allowed to become effective. If the commission does
not suspend the rate, no hearing is held and the rate becomes effective
subject to possible future complaint and hearing at the request of competitors or other affected persons. Under some statutes, however, rate
increases cannot be allowed to become effective without a full hearing.
If the rate is suspended, its effectiveness is postponed for a period
which varies in different statutes, but is designed to allow the lawfulness of the rate to be fully determined before the rate becomes effective.
During this suspension period a formal rate proceeding, with a decision
on the basis of a record after an evidentiary hearing, considers the lawfulness of the suspended rate. In this proceeding, which arises when
the rate is suspended, the proponent of the rate ordinarily has the
burden of proving that the rate is lawful.
Other formal rate proceedings arise by complaint rather than by
suspension. The commission, on its own motion or on complaint of
competitors, consumer interests, or public bodies, may initiate a formal
proceeding to determine the lawfulness of existing rates. In these
cases the burden of proving that the rate is unlawful usually falls on
the complainant or the agency staff. While in a suspension case the
commission may be limited to disallowing the proposed rate or leaving
the existing rate in effect, in a complaint case the commission must
procedures. The reader should refer to particular federal or state statutes for
further detail. The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 397 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-1601 (1964), is the parent statute. The Federal Power Act, 41 Stat.
1063 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1964), is a closer analogue on
the federal scene to the typical state public utility statute. The New York Public
Service Law and the California Public Utilities Code are among the most comprehensive of the state enactments.
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itself fix a lawful rate for the future if it finds the existing rate unlawful. Authority to compel higher rates (minimum rate authority) may
or may not be given to the particular commission; but lower rates may
always be ordered if existing rates are found to be excessive.
Rate questions may also arise and be litigated in licensing cases involving the certification of new authority or new facilities. The nature
and lawfulness of the rates that an applicant plans to charge may be
an important factor in determining whether it is in the public interest
to grant his application.
In general, the substantive standard for existing and proposed rates
is that they be "just and reasonable." In addition, most statutes prohibit discriminatory rates of various types. Methods for determining
when a rate is "just and reasonable," or whether an "unjust discrimination" is involved, ordinarily are not prescribed in detail, although
the statute may list factors to be considered. In practice, such certainty as is to be found must be discovered in the gradual accretion of
regulatory decisions and rules, punctuated by occasional judicial decisions or statutory amendments. The zone of "reasonableness" is usually sufficiently broad so that the agency has a broad discretion to fix
the rate at any point within certain limits.
Although many rate proceedings have common elements, they often
differ from one another in important respects. One variable with procedural implications concerns the number of rates and parties which
are involved. If a single rate of a single company is involved, the
scope of the proceeding is likely to be limited. When the rates of a
related group of companies are at issue, the case has larger dimensions
and more parties. The extreme case is a massive proceeding involving
the entire rate structure of a group of companies or throughout a substantial area. Rulemaking techniques of investigation and consultation
may properly be substituted for adjudicatory hearings as the issues
become more general and industry-wide.
The availability of an adjudicatory hearing may also be affected by
the circumstance of whether the utility is being ordered to reduce or
to increase its rates. In regulation of maximum rates, as in traditional
public utility regulation of natural monopolies in the electric, gas, and
telephone fields, the regulatory agency places a ceiling on higher rates
or orders a decrease in existing rates. In minimum rate regulation,
on the other hand, the rate agency establishes a floor below which
rates cannot gravitate. Rate proceedings in the transportation field
usually are of this type.
Individualized determinations on the basis of a record after a hearing
having many adjudicatory characteristics have in the past been thought
to be required when an agency was fixing maximum rates, since a
rate set at too low a level would result in confiscation of private prop-
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erty. Although it is customary for statutes to provide for the same
type of hearing in cases involving minimum rates, this constitutional
argument is inapplicable. Losses resulting from competitive forces
are not entitled to constitutional protection;9 their prevention must rest
on statutory grounds. The desirability of trial-type hearings in minimum rate cases stems from the importance of providing protection and
participation to the interests that are adversely affected by orders
establishing rate floors-the desire of competitors to engage in vigorous competition and of consumers to pay a lower rate.
Another variable which affects the handling of rate cases is the volume of cases and the relative urgency of prompt decision. Procedures
which may be appropriate in handling the rates ified by one major
telephone system (the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. and its
various subsidiaries) or by eleven trunkline air carriers may not
operate with the same efficiency when applied to the thousands of
tariffs filed by hundreds of motor carriers in a given jurisdiction. Some
commissions have a trickle of major rate cases; others are required to
process an enormous volume of proceedings, large and small. The
demands of the environment may shape as well as strain the procedures which are adopted.

I. "JuDICIALIzATIoN" vs. SuIVnuARY AnDmmismrATIVE DETERMINATION
What kind of a hearing should be provided in rate cases? Exploration of this question is desirable at the outset. Assumptions concerning the reliability of various truth-seeking techniques, as well as value
judgments concerning the degree of public participation that is desirable, stand revealed when this question is debated.
At one extreme is the position that rate determinations should be
made through the use of highly judicialized procedures on the prototype of the common-law trial. The difficulty with this view is that it
neglects the important differences between common-law trials and rate
cases. The common-law trial is an acceptable method of resolving a
private dispute between two persons. The drama and formality of the
proceeding provide greater assurance that the result will be accepted
by the participants and the general community. The issue in a common-law trial usually turns on an evaluation of witnesses' recollections
of a non-recurring past event (such as an automobile accident). The
techniques of proof, especially the hearsay rule and the use of crossexamination, are designed to overcome the inexperience of the trier of
8

See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Smyth v. Ames, 169

U.S. 466 (1898).
9 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 140
(1939).
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fact-the lay jury-in passing upon demeanor and credibility. The
element of citizen participation through the lay jury functions well in
simple situations and embodies the additional values of community
participation in law-making.
Most rate cases differ so substantially from those for which the
methods of the common-law trial were devised that a degree of departure from trial-type procedures is warranted. Among the major
differences are the following: First, the essentially public nature of
most rate cases makes it undesirable that the outcome should turn
solely on the private desires and interests of the parties. Second, the
typical rate case does not involve controverted questions of fact on
which credibility of witnesses is important. Rather, the decider is required to apply an often vague judgment having policy implications
to conclusions drawn from a mass of factual data (the data itself, as
distinguished from the conclusions drawn from it, is unlikely to be in
dispute). Third, the number of parties and issues is generally much
larger and the parties' interest in the proceeding varies considerably.
Staff participation in the hearing may be required in order to assure
that all facets of the problem, not merely those favoring the groups
participating in the hearing, are brought out. Finally, the heavy volume of cases and the limited attention which the ultimate decidersthe agency heads-can give an individual case may require further
departures from judicialized procedures. Procedures must be designed
to present the case in an intelligible and manageable form to the
agency heads. In the preparation of final decisions, the agency heads
may be required to place extensive reliance on subordinates.
At the other extreme, it is sometimes suggested that the type of
managerial discretion involved in rate fixing, and the elusiveness of
the factors entering into this judgment, call for the exercise of summary discretionary power. The process of determining the lawfulness
of rates, under this approach, would be handled in much the same
manner as the agencies presently handle the determination of whether
a newly filed rate should be suspended: an administrative determination made in expeditious and summary fashion on the basis of written
materials submitted by the parties and without a hearing, without issuance of an opinion purporting to state the reasons for decision, and
without opportunity for further administrative or any judicial review.
"Ratemaking by fiat," however, is unrealistic as well as unwise.
Party participation contributes to an accurate and informed disposition of rate cases. Judicial review, although occasionally abused, supplies a broader perspective as a counterpoint to the often narrow jurisdiction and outlook of the agency. In any event, statutes almost
universally require a determination on the basis of a record in contested rate proceedings. Indeed, the abolition of such a hearing in
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maximum rate cases would raise serious constitutional questions.
More modest proposals for enhancing administrative discretion and
reducing "overjudicialization" must be taken more seriously. It is
arguable that better results would be achieved in complicated rate
proceedings if party participation was limited and the open hearing
presided over by an independent hearing examiner was eliminated.
Under this approach, the private parties would submit written materials in response to an agency request, followed by an ex parte investigation by the agency staff. The staff would then draft a tentative decision for the agency, based not only upon such written materials but
also upon any other data and information gathered by the staff. Following the issuance of this tentative decision, the parties would be
provided with a limited opportunity for rebuttal of "noticed facts"
and for cross-examination. Thereafter, briefs would be submitted to
the agency heads, who would then issue their final decision.
Several elements of this procedural package, particularly the reliance on written materials, will be considered favorably at a later point.
The basic issue here is whether it is desirable, on balance, to adhere
to and improve the hearing examiner system as developed under the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act,10 or whether instead there
should be a shift to a different approach, in which party participation
would be more limited and the agency staff would dominate the
process.
The arguments advanced in favor of reliance on the staff to gather
the relevant information and to formulate proposals for final decision
by agency heads stress the following views: (1) that a staff of experts,
reflecting different types of specialized knowledge or expertise, can
do a more effective and a more expeditious job in complex and technical cases than an individual hearing examiner; (2) that staff-formulated initial decisions are more likely to be responsive to agency policy
and to be internally consistent; and (3) that the use of judicialized
procedures, with emphasis on the oral testimonial process, is not geared
to the needs of complicated cases involving the application of law and
policy to a mass of economic and social data.
As an abstract proposition, there is much to be said for this line of
argument. Procedural institutions, however, cannot be evaluated
apart from the social and political processes of which they are a part.
Prospects for improvement in the handling of rate cases would seem
to be greater with continued adherence to the hearing examiner system. Some of the considerations influencing this judgment deserve
separate statement.
First, at some point before a commission signs and issues a final
1060 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
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decision in a major contested rate case, a job must be done somewhere
in the agency (whether by one person or a combination of persons)
of preparing a comprehensive and useful analysis of the substantial
issues in the case, based upon a careful study of the record and briefs.
An independent hearing examiner, who has lived with the case from
the beginning, is likely to be the most qualified person to perform this
job. If it is well done, the case will have been reduced to more manageable proportions before the agency heads are required to rule on it.
Second, the important contribution which can be made by staff experts should be made through positions taken in open hearing, where
their views are made known to all the parties and are subject to testing
and evaluation on the same terms as the positions advanced by private
parties. The correct answers to the problems of a case are not locked
somewhere in the minds and experience of staff personnel. The attempt to state the staff position persuasively in a public hearing may
in fact assist in the formulation of a supportable position. In addition,
where the open hearing is dispensed with, the agency does not have
the benefit of the full contribution which the interested parties can
make to the resolution of the case. The interplay of private parties
and staff in open hearing, each having a different role to perform, usually produces useful and desirable results in the better marshalling of
data and better informed decisions.
Third, the basic reasons which supported the emphasis in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 194611 on the role of the hearing
examiner in agency decisions remain important today. Procedures
which allow staff members to conduct ex parte investigations, render
tentative decisions, and then advise the agency heads with respect to
the final decision tend to be arbitrary in fact as well as appearance.
Use of an independent hearing examiner protects against one-sided,
biased, or arbitrary staff determinations, eliminating the appearance
or actuality of unfairness. A more limited role for the staff at the
hearing stage also makes it easier to justify staff advice to agency
heads at the decisional stage, where staff assistance is more essential.
Finally, the long-run possibilities of improving the average caliber
and performance of hearing examiners are substantially greater than
would appear to be possible at the staff level. Recruitment and retention problems tend to be much less severe with hearing examiners
than with the professional staff personnel, and the gap is likely to
widen in the future. A greater emphasis on staff control cannot be
justified solely on the ground that, if administered by wise and able
people, it would produce beneficent results; procedures must be designed to do the job with the men of average parts who are likely to
"160 Stat. 241-42, 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1006-07, 1010 (1964).
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be available. A really able staff will find ample leeway within present
procedures to make a major contribution to the proper resolution of
litigated rate cases. Moreover, the occasional difficulties of case-bycase adjudication may be avoided by imaginative use of rulemaking
authority or aggressive use of discretionary powers to initiate proceedings or to suspend rate filings.
HI.

CONTNUOUS 1HEARING VS. TRIAL BY INTERLUDES

A defect which has contributed to delay and ineffectiveness in the
hearing of major rate cases is the widespread practice of trial by
stages, with the direct evidence and cross-examination of each party
presented in separate phases, each followed by a lengthy recess. At
the beginning of the hearing, for example, a rate applicant might
present his direct testimony and exhibits; and then the hearing would
be recessed for a lengthy period to allow staff and other parties to
prepare for cross-examination. Substantial recesses would also take
place between each subsequent shift from one party to another or
from direct to cross-examination. Even though the total days of actual
hearing are relatively few in number, a "hearing by interludes" usually extends over the better part of a year or longer.
The discontinuous hearing has a number of advantages. It prevents
surprise; it allows each party to prepare as he goes along; and it may
result in a well-organized and complete record. Commonly, however,
these virtues are either lacking or are outweighed by the deficiencies
of such a leisurely approach. Often the critical issues are not identified
at the outset. The availability of time in the future is apt to lead to
inadequate advance preparation. If the case is not organized to
resolve the critical issues quickly and accurately, an aimless and
diffused hearing will produce a record that, despite its bulk, fails to
provide an adequate basis for an informed decision.
At this point in time a move away from the "hearing by interludes?'
approach is desirable. In cases of smaller dimension the hearing should
be continuous; in cases of larger scale, a few recesses may be called
for. This is feasible as well as desirable if combined with other measures that have proved their efficacy in the expedition of rate hearings.
The early submission in written form of the direct case for the party
having the burden of proof is a vital step. There is no reason why the
rate applicant in a suspension case, for example, cannot distribute the
prepared testimony and exhibits in support of his filing at an early
date. The rate should not have been filed without some assurance
that it could be justified if protested. The relevant information is in
the control of the rate applicant, and submission in written form is not
troublesome because the witnesses' testimony must be prepared by the
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lawyer in any event. Most of the witnesses are professionals or experts testifying on the inferences to be drawn from generally undisputed facts.
The other parties to the case, including the staff, should also submit
their direct testimony and exhibits in written form in advance of the
date set for the beginning of the hearing. In simpler types of cases it
is desirable that all of the parties exchange their direct testimony on
the same date; in more complicated cases the party having the burden
of proof should precede the other parties by a period of from thirty to
ninety days.
The advance exchange of written evidence provides the basis not
only for negotiated settlement but for effective use of conference techniques. Special procedural arrangements, full exchange of relevant
information, stipulation of facts, identification of contested issues for
hearing, and the like, should be completed prior to hearing under the
supervision of the hearing examiner assigned to the case. Early assignment of a hearing examiner, and an opportunity on his part to
address his attention to the case, are also required.
The hearing itself should be devoted to cross-examination and redirect. Advance exchange of written evidence makes it possible for
the parties to be prepared for a session limited largely to cross-examination. Since the issues are clearer, a more adequate record results and the hearing may be shorter. Of course, careful control must
be exercised to assure adequate preparation by the parties and to prevent the submission of direct evidence under the guise of re-direct.

II. ORAL

TESTnmhONy vs. WRrrF

EVIENCE

The practice of preparing direct testimony and exhibits in written
form and distributing them in advance of the hearing is fortunately
becoming more and more common. Several federal agencies, especially
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Power Commission, have
led the way, and state agencies are beginning to follow suit. In some
instances the advance preparation of written evidence is limited to the
direct case of the party having the burden of proof; in others it is
extended to staff and opposing parties.
Rate cases by their nature are well suited to the use of written
procedures. The testimony and exhibits which constitute the bulk of
the record in rate proceedings consist of the views and opinions of expert and professional witnesses. The underlying facts are placed in
the record in the form of detailed exhibits, with an expert testifying
concerning the manner of preparation of the exhibit, the supporting
rationale, and the inferences which he believes should be drawn from
it. While there may be factual disputes, their resolution is likely to
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rest on the acceptance of one expert's judgment rather than that of
another. Credibility in the usual sense of conflicting stories as to factual
occurrences is rarely involved. Although cross-examination of expert
witnesses is often helpful or necessary, it is virtually impossible for
one party to establish his own direct case by cross-examination of another party's witnesses. An expert witness will occasionally admit
specific weaknesses in his analysis, or qualify his conclusions, but he
will shortly be out of a job if he fails to stick to the story which, in
cooperation with counsel, he has prepared in advance. The major
purpose of cross-examination in such proceedings is not to reduce a
witness to a shattered hulk by the admission of error, but to explore
all of the considerations entering into what must remain a matter of

judgment.
Effective participation in a case of this nature requires that attorneys
for staff and for private parties prepare their witnesses and exhibits in
advance. The requirement that an expert's story be put in written
form prior to hearing is an insignificant burden and results in more
precise and informative testimony. Attorneys dislike the idea largely
because the procedure is unfamiliar or because it reduces the element
of surprise which they traditionally regard as an important tool-oftrade in adversary proceedings. Even in court proceedings, however,
the current trend is to reduce the factor of surprise through discovery
and other pre-trial devices. In rate proceedings before a regulatory
body the element of surprise has no proper place and its elimination is
in the public interest.

Exchange of written evidence in advance of hearing has many benefits. One of the most obvious is that it facilitates a negotiated settlement. Most important, it sharpens the issues at the hearing and results in a more effective record. In a substantial number of cases, particularly those of less moment, the parties may be satisfied with their
written presentations and an oral hearing becomes unnecessary. Properly handled, written procedures result in a more adequate record
being produced in a shorter space of time.
Objections to the use of written evidence take several forms. Attorneys who are unfamiliar with the technique initially object, but
their hostility usually melts as they acquire familiarity. Today a substantial number of practitioners advocate greater reliance on prepared
testimony. Another objection, the danger that the written submissions
may become obsolete or the affiants unavailable, has force when the
hearing date is significantly delayed. The solution is to hold the hearing shortly after the exchange of written evidence has been completed.
Other objections stem not from the technique itself but from a failure to manage it properly. Some attorneys, for example, will attempt
to hold back major elements of their case in order to surprise their
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opponents on re-direct. To the extent that spineless rulings by a hearig examiner permit them to do so, the utility of written procedures
is destroyed. A related abuse, the tendency of attorneys to "can
testimony in an overly general or argumentative manner, may also be
controlled by prudent rulings of the presiding examiner.
Maximum use of written evidence should be encouraged. There has
now been sufficient experience with the technique to justify a further
shift away from the live testimonial process. Potential difficulties of
written procedures may be controlled or eliminated by careful handling; and the original hostility to them of some attorneys and examiners has diminished as experience with their use has been acquired. This does not mean that oral hearing will atrophy-crossexamination will still be required in most cases. But it does mean that
trial by surprise will vanish from rate proceedings, that the oral hearing will be shorter and more useful, and that "hearing by interludes"
will cease to be customary. The normal pattern should be a hearing
with limited or no recesses that is largely devoted to cross-examination of materials exchanged in advance.
IV. PERSONAL Vs. INsTIToINAL DEcIsIoNs
It is possible to take the position that agency procedures should

be designed to allow the professional staff of an agency to dominate the
decisional process. The justification for such a position would be that
the staff comprises the only group in the agency with specialized knowledge and interest in regulatory problems, as against an uninformed,
often lazy, and peripatetic group of men who temporarily occupy
chairs as commissioners. In rejecting this position, I start with the
premise that the executive and the legislature have placed reliance on
the integrity and judgment of the agency heads. If procedures are
adequately designed, the commissioners can inform themselves concerning the matters which they must decide. The attitudes and experience which they bring from the outside (which are "political" in
the larger and finer sense of the word) are a proper means of democratic control over the otherwise headless fourth branch.
It cannot be expected that a busy agency head can regularly give
his personal attention to the massive records in the rate cases which
reach him for decision. In many regulatory commissions the demands
on the commissioner's time are much too formidable to permit anything more than an occasional contact with the record in a case of
special interest or importance. His knowledge of the case must be
obtained from sources which are more succinct and manageable.
In most rate agencies, five major sources of information may be
available: (1) initial decision of the hearing examiner; (2) exceptions
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and briefs of staff and parties; (3) oral argument; (4) personalized
staff assistance by the commissioner's subordinates; and (5) staff assistance which is available to the commissioners as a group. Whatever
the particular pattern, the mass of material resulting from all of the
earlier stages must be presented to the commissioners in a form that is
intelligible and useful to them. Otherwise, all that has gone before will
prove to be an elaborate charade, unrelated to the actual grounds of decision. The objective should be to provide agency heads with the information they need to reach satisfactory conclusions on both factual
and policy issues, without flooding them with more than they can usefully handle.
A much debated issue concerns the extent to which agency heads
should be permitted to consult with staff members during the decisional
stage. In most state agencies a substantial amount of consultation with
the heads of various operating bureaus is customary. In the federal
agencies, on the other hand, the trend is away from consultation. Both
positions have their problems and the choice must be made on pragmatic grounds.
Critics of consultation on the part of agency heads should face the
implications of their position. One alternative is to deny agency heads
any expert assistance whatever, limiting them to the adversary presentation in the briefs and oral argument. The danger here is that uninformed decisions will be the result. Instead of providing protection
to the various interests involved, this approach may magnify the danger
of extraneous considerations governing the decision. If agency heads
are not free to fully inform themselves of the facts and issues, they may
decide the case on grounds outside the record.
A second alternative would be to provide each agency head, or the
agency heads as a group, with a set of independent specialists isolated
from the rest of the staff. This would satisfy the most fastidious notions of separation of functions, but would present other problems.
A multiplication of specialized staffs, each doing the same work on the
same case independently of one another, is costly and time-consuming.
Fragmentation of the independent regulatory agency into separate
staffs, respectively serving the bureau heads, the hearings examiners,
and the agency heads, is neither desirable in itself nor required by
abuses arising out of present practice.
Determining the proper extent of consultation on the part of agency
heads with staff members requires the balancing of conflicting considerations. On the one hand, it would be naive to assume that staff
advice during the final decisional stage will be totally disinterested or
without influence on the outcome of cases. Staff officials who played
a key role in formulating the staff position will be hesitant to disown
the product of their labors or to criticize their subordinates. The
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views of agency heads may be affected by the articulate presentation
of staff views at this stage.
On the other hand, the agency heads need informed advice and assistance in order to effectuate their own policies in agency decisions.
The myriad details on which advice may be needed make it cumbersome or impossible for all of their inquiries to be placed in the public
record. It is cheaper and perhaps better to have one staff rather than
tvo or three. And it is unwise to wall off the agency heads from the
most accessible and effective assistance which is likely to be available
to them.
Here, as elsewhere, a balance must be struck. Different people,
different states, will strike it at a somewhat different point. One line
that can be defended is a distinction between consultation with staff
who participated at the hearing and those who did not. Participants
in the proceeding are likely to be influenced by the heat of battle and
less able to detach themselves from their prior involvement in the
case. Staff members who did not participate in the case, and particularly those at the higher levels, can be expected to take a broader
and more objective view when asked for their advice. They are more
apt to put themselves in the desired role of being helpful to the agency
heads who are asking the questions.
The nature of the consultation and its setting are important factors.
There is little reason why a commissioner who desires information concerning material in the record should not address specific queries to
the hearing examiner who was involved in the case. Unlike the individuals involved in the final decisional process, such as personal
assistants or opinion writers, the hearing examiner is thoroughly
familiar with the raw data in the record. An exaggerated concern for
the form of propriety rather than its substance should not persuade
agency heads to disregard the hearing examiner's notes or memory
as if they did not exist. Similarly, when the agency heads are contemplating an approach to a policy issue different from that taken
by the hearing examiner, it may be important that the implications of
the proposed action be fully explored with knowledgeable members
of the staff.
A related issue affecting the informed participation by agency heads
in the decisional process is whether decisions should issue under the
name of individual commissioners. Experience thus far indicates that
signed opinions are no solution to the opinion-writing deficiencies of
regulatory agencies, although they may be of some value in highlighting the importance of personal consideration by the deciders. Individualized opinions encourage commissioners to take a greater interest in the process of working out a rationalization for a decision.
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Limitations of time, however, make it impossible for a commissioner
to actually write an opinion in most instances. The addition of personal touches to a decision entirely thought out and prepared by someone else is not in itself a great advance in administrative procedure.
Yet the signed opinion is desirable because it focuses the attention of
agency heads on the importance of their written product.
CONCLUSION

There are no simple answers to the problems of delay, poor quality,
and lack of direction which characterize some public utility regulation.
The problem of delay is illustrative. It is tempting to search for a
scapegoat. The human mind responds eagerly to the notion that something or someone is at fault. Further study, however, reveals that delay is not the result of a limited number of specific causes, much less
wrongdoing, but of the slow accretion of numerous pressures, many
of them closely related to the complexities of the functions that are being performed. Some of them are inevitable in the sense that the bulk
of cases, or their individual intricacy, is such that they cannot be
handled with dispatch without a large increase in appropriations or
staff of the regulatory body, or a slighting of procedural safeguards.
The variety of public utility rate proceedings suggests a cautious
approach to the problem of procedural reform. Across-the-board
remedies are likely to be productive of more mischief than solace unless their probable effects are carefully studied in advance. Uniformity and change for their own sake are of little or no value; they
should be encouraged only when it is apparent that common problems
would be amenable to a common solution. Any evaluation of administrative procedures must rest on a judgment which balances the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal.
Finally, suggestions for change, such as those advanced in this
Article, must be evaluated in terms of the conditions under which the
rate process must operate and the needs which it must fulfill. Existing
substantive policies under each regulatory statute should not be inadvertently or intentionally distorted by procedural changes. The environment in which public utility regulation takes place should not
be overlooked. The dependence upon private capital and initiative
requires that regulation maintain a high degree of continuity and
stability.
Our regulatory pattern constitutes a middle way between public
ownership and private monopoly. It must be expected that the processes of decision will be surrounded by procedural safeguards which
would not be used in private decision-making. Party participation in
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regulation, where public decisions so importantly affect private rights,
may well extend beyond the point of mere efficiency. In our tradition
the greater acceptability of techniques which provide ample participation to affected interests is itself an important value.
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